REORDERING THE WORLD: GREAT-POWER COMPETITION, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL RIVALRY, AND THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE G7, BRICS, SCO, AND INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS

Abstract

The international system is undergoing a consequential reordering as established Western-led institutions confront the growing influence of emerging powers, intensifying technological competition, and the strategic reconfiguration of global economic relationships. The Group of Seven (G7), BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and Indo-Pacific strategic frameworks represent distinct but increasingly interconnected approaches to international order, economic governance, technological development, and security cooperation. This paper examines how these arrangements contribute to the transformation of global power relations and whether their interaction is producing multipolarity, institutional fragmentation, or a more complex configuration of overlapping geopolitical networks. Employing a qualitative comparative research design, the study integrates neorealism, institutionalism, and geoeconomic analysis with documentary evidence from official declarations, policy frameworks, and relevant scholarly literature. The analysis identifies five principal dimensions of competition: institutional legitimacy, trade and financial governance, technological sovereignty, critical-resource security, and regional strategic alignment. The findings suggest that the G7 retains considerable influence through advanced technological capabilities, financial institutions, regulatory coordination, and established security partnerships, while BRICS seeks greater representation for emerging economies and expanded alternatives in development finance and international governance. The SCO prioritizes regional security, sovereign equality, connectivity, and economic cooperation, whereas Indo-Pacific frameworks combine maritime security, strategic partnerships, supply-chain resilience, and technological cooperation. Nevertheless, internal differences, asymmetric capabilities, and overlapping memberships complicate the formation of cohesive rival blocs. The paper argues that the emerging order is best understood as competitive interdependence: a system in which strategic rivalry intensifies without eliminating economic interconnection or institutional cooperation. This configuration creates opportunities for middle powers and developing economies but also increases the risks of technological exclusion, coercive economic statecraft, and fragmented global governance.