THE SINO-AMERICAN OPENING AND PAKISTAN: DIPLOMACY, MEDIATION, AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES, 1969–1972

Abstract

Accounts of the Sino-American opening often begin with Henry Kissinger’s secret flight from Pakistan to Beijing in July 1971. The flight was dramatic, but it came after two years of private messages carried by President Yahya Khan and Ambassador Agha Hilaly. Pakistan gave Washington and Beijing a discreet way to test one another and arranged the trip that brought Kissinger and Zhou Enlai face to face. It did not shape the bargain they reached. This article traces the channel from Nixon’s first approach to Yahya in 1969 through the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, asking how Pakistan made contact possible, why the two powers trusted it, and what followed for Pakistan and South Asia. The opening grew from shifting calculations in Washington and Beijing, particularly their concern with the Soviet Union. Yet Washington’s reliance on Yahya also affected its response to the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger backed his government as violence escalated; their support did not preserve united Pakistan, and China did not intervene in the war. Pakistan gained prestige from its diplomatic role, but once direct U.S.–China contact was established, Islamabad no longer controlled the channel.